Posted on 星期四, 3月 12, 2009 at 1:27 下午

Ed Kane: TARP recipients paid out $76.7 million on lobbying and $37 million on federal campaign contributions in 2008 and (through Feb 2, 2009) received access to $295.2 billion in TARP funds. The ratio of lobbying expense to TARP receipts suggests that, during the initial stages of the crisis, financial institutions have reaped extraordinary benefits from investing in efforts to scare federal officials and to tell them how “best” to dispel crisis pressures. Following this self-interested advice has been ineffective partly because the return from expanding large firms’ investments in lobbying activity has dwarfed the return they could expect to earn from diligently attending to their ordinary business of intermediating the nation’s flow of savings and investment. See here. (HT: EconLog)

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排队经济学(Rationing by Waiting)

大规模的排队，如中国的春运，是学习价格理论和研究公共政策的优良范本，值得每一位对经济、舆论、政策等领域感兴趣的朋友深思。本站以明快的方式回答各种常见问题，包括：（1）回家过年是不是刚性需求；（2）车票提价有没有增加乘客负担；（3）黄牛党有没有责任；（4）垄断产业的产品涨价合理吗；（5）春运难题与铁路垄断的关系；（6）火车票低价造成的浪费在哪里；（7）应该如何有效地帮助穷人；（8）租和寻租的经济学概念；（9）关于排队的理论文献等。欢迎浏览！

科斯：我被反垄断法烦透了

科斯（Ronald H. Coase）：“我被反垄断法烦透了。假如价格涨了，法官就说是‘垄断定价’；价格跌了，就说是‘掠夺定价’；价格不变，就说是‘勾结定价’”。(Ronald Coase said he had gotten tired of anti-trust because when the prices went up the judges said it was monopoly, when the prices went down they said it was predatory pricing, and when they stayed the same they said it was tacit collusion. — Source: William Landes, “The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Econ at Chicago”, JLE (1981)) 详见这里和这里。

布坎南：我们尚未堕落成随营的娼妓

布坎南（James M. Buchanan）：需求量和价格之间的反向关系，是经济科学的核心命题，它体现了这样的预设，即人类的选择行为足够理性，以致是可以预测的。没有一个物理学家会说“水往上流”，也没有一个自重的经济学家会说“提高最低工资可以增加就业”。这种说法，要是认真地生发下去，将无异于全盘否定了经济学，使其科学含义荡然无存；要是这样，经济学家除了撰写迎合意识形态偏好的文章，就别无可为了。值得庆幸的是，只有一小撮经济学家愿意背弃两个世纪的经济学教诲；我们尚未堕落成一群随营的娼妓（详见这里）。

Becker: Financial Regulations

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Pure Rent Seeking